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The Tower of David: 
Social Order in a Vertical Community 
Manuel A. Gómez* 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 9, 2012, a sting commando operation that involved more than 
one hundred National Guard troops, members of the anti-kidnapping 
Special Force Unit, and the local police stormed into la Torre de David (the 
“Tower of David” or “TOD”), an unfinished and abandoned skyscraper in 
downtown Caracas, Venezuela.  The building, which had been occupied by 
squatters since 2007, was suspected of serving as the hideout of a criminal 
organization responsible for the kidnapping of a Costa Rican diplomat that 
occurred a few days before April 9.  The operation came as no surprise to 
the general public because of the tower’s bad reputation as a crime-ridden 
place where drug trafficking and other dangerous activities were allegedly 
commonplace.  After hours of searching the entire building and its 
surroundings, the police found no signs of the kidnapped diplomat or his 
captors. 
Furthermore, the police did not find any evidence of criminal activities 
occurring in the building, nor any of the alleged widespread drug trafficking 
so widely rumored.  The suspicion of TOD being a crime scene turned out 
to be unfounded. The true discovery was, instead, the existence of a 
reasonably well-organized community inside the otherwise derelict office 
building.  Since its initial occupation five years earlier, TOD had become 
the residence—not of criminals, but instead—of several hundred displaced 
families, most of them who had lost their homes to natural disasters, or who 
relocated from the suburbs seeking better work opportunities in the heart of 
Caracas, the Venezuelan capital.  Despite the precarious conditions of the 
abandoned building, which at the time of the initial occupation lacked 
electricity, sewage, running water, and most internal walls and windows; 
the first squatters made it their home, and gradually repurposed it and 
transformed it into a self-contained vertical community.1 
The generally negative connotation attributed to TOD, and its 
association with chaos, lawlessness, the criminal underworld, and other 
 
 *     Associate Dean of International and Graduate Studies and Associate Professor of Law, Florida 
International University College of Law. 
1 ALFREDO BRILLEMBOURG & HUBERT KLUMPNER, TORRE DAVID: INFORMAL VERTICAL 
COMMUNITIES 33 (2013) [hereinafter Brillembourg, Torre David]. 
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“urban ills”2 seem to be more a product of media portrayal and commercial 
exploitation than reality.  A number of recent films,3 TV shows,4 books,5 
and even a sub-segment of the tourism industry,6 have contributed to 
highlight the upsurge of a slum culture and its alleged role in contributing to 
foster anti-social behavior, poverty, and unhealthy living conditions.7  In the 
particular case of TOD, the media depiction of the occupation has been 
generally consistent with this negative view.8  For example, an episode of 
the famous TV show Homeland, titled “Tower of David,” which aired on 
October of 2013, depicted TOD as a lawless place run by a group of 
mercenaries led by “El Niño,” which happens to be the same nickname of 
TOD’s main leader. The difference is that the real “El Niño” is not a 
mercenary but an evangelical pastor. 
In the real TOD, within months of the initial occupations, the first 
residents worked toward adapting the interior of the building to 
accommodate their needs, and set the foundations for a permanent 
community that spread from the ground level to the twenty-eight floor.  
Soon thereafter, the otherwise inhabitable structure boasted a makeshift 
intricate plumbing system resembling a Rube-Goldberg contraption,9 but 
which provided running water to residents from the city main all the way 
into their apartments.10  The electrical power was initially taken from the 
city’s street poles via a web of rigged wires and switchbox. However, after 
 
2 GERALD D. SUTTLES, THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE SLUM: ETHNICITY AND TERRITORY IN THE 
INNER CITY 3 (U. Chicago Press 1968) [hereinafter Gerald Suttles, Social Order of the Slum]. 
3 See, e.g., CITY OF GOD (Cidade de Deus) (O2 Films, 2002), which depicts the crime-ridden 
slums (favelas) of Rio de Janeiro, or SLUMDOG MILLIONAIRE (Warner Brothers, 2008), which portrays 
the challenges of life in a Mumbai shantytown.  
4 Homeland, Season 3, Episode 3, (Showtime, October 2013). 
5 See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS (Verso, 2007), JANICE PERLMAN, FAVELA: FOUR 
DECADES OF LIVING ON THE EDGE IN RIO DE JANEIRO (Oxford University Press, 2011), TOBIAS HECHT, 
AT HOME IN THE STREET: STREET CHILDREN OF NORTHEAST BRAZIL (Cambridge University Press, 
1998), ROBERT NEUWIRTH, SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATTERS, A NEW URBAN WORLD (Routledge, 
2004), and, BRODWYN FISCHER, BRYAN MCCANN & JAVIER AUYERO, CITIES FROM SCRATCH: 
POVERTY AND INFORMALITY IN URBAN LATIN AMERICA (Duke University Press, 2014). 
6 SLUM TOURISM RESEARCH NETWORK, http://slumtourism.net/what-is-slum-tourism/ (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2015).  
7 ANUPURNA RATHOR, SLUM DWELERS: CURSE ON DEVELOPMENT 14 (2003).  
8 See, e.g., Maolis Castro, Invasión: El crimen se refugia en la torre Confinanzas, EL NACIONAL 
(CARACAS) April 11, 2012, available at: http://www.reportero24.com/2012/04/invasion-el-crimen-se-
refugia-en-la-torre-confinanzas/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2015). 
9 Rube Goldberg was an American cartoonist, inventor and Pulitzer prize winner who became 
famous for his illustrations of makeshift machines that performed relatively simple tasks through very 
complicated over engineered mechanisms.  Given the popularity of his inventions, Rube Goldberg 
became associated with any unnecessarily convoluted mechanism; hence the term “Rube Goldberg 
machine.”  See RUBE GOLDBERG, https://www.rubegoldberg.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2015); see also 
RUBE GOLDBERG MACHINE WIKI, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rube_Goldberg_machine (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2015). 
10 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 216. 
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2009, when the community became formally organized with the creation of 
a cooperative association, electricity began to be supplied steadily from the 
street into the building through several lines that extended from a city trunk 
cable provided by the electricity company.11  A crew of residents working 
around the clock was given the task to supervise the distribution of 
electricity and make the necessary repairs to ensure that the service 
remained uninterrupted.12  TOD residents also built internal walls with 
cement, wood, and other construction materials in order to create 
“apartments” and other “private” spaces to which they brought in furniture, 
appliances, decorative objects, and even painted the walls with colorful 
tones, thus creating the imagery of a lively neighborhood. 
Common areas were also delineated. As the TOD population grew, its 
residents sought ways to facilitate life in their vertical community and make 
it less dependent on the outside world by setting up small convenience 
stores, hair salons, a bakery, a homemade ice cream shop, an arcade, a gym, 
and even a nursery/childcare center.  Given that TOD had no working 
elevators and no stairs, access to the building was only possible through a 
vehicular ramp that motorcycles working as taxis (known as “mototaxis” in 
Venezuela) used to shuttle residents up and down the building.  Community 
leaders decided the allocation of apartments, or “spaces”—as TOD 
residents called them—based on different factors, including the age and 
physical condition of those in each family group. Given the difficult access 
to the building, the lower floors were reserved to the elderly and to families 
with small children. 
Despite the seemingly private nature of certain spaces allocated to 
individual residents and their families, the transfer and negotiation of 
apartments was subject to approval by the “floor coordinator” or by a board 
member of the organization “Cooperativa de Vivienda Caciques de 
Venezuela” (“CCV”) established in 2009.  In addition, TOD residents 
devised a set of norms governing the use of public and private spaces, 
collection and disposal of trash, use of electricity, water, internal 
transportation, and general maintenance.  The residents, through the CCV, 
also set forth criteria for the admission of new occupants into the building, 
and created a special monthly fee payable by each member to defray the 
cost of common expenses.  The community was divided into “floors,” each 
under the care of a coordinator.  A poster containing a general code of 
conduct, a table with the allocation of tasks, and other relevant information 
has been placed on each floor for all residents to see.13 
 
11 Id. at 222. 
12 Id. 
13 Javier Brassesco, Una Mirada desde la Torre de David, EL UNIVERSAL (CARACAS), Sept. 14, 
2011, available at http://www.eluniversal.com/caracas/120914/una-mirada-desde-la-torre-de-david. 
218 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:215 
 
Such level of social order attained by TOD residents took the outside 
world by surprise.  The emergence of a well-organized community under 
such adverse circumstances also caught the attention of social scientists, 
architects, and urban planners.  The most salient example was a group 
called Urban Think Tank (“U-TT”), which devoted significant resources to 
develop a comprehensive plan to maximize the use of the building in a 
sustainable, socially responsible, and efficient manner.14  U-TT’s final 
proposal was entered into the prestigious International Architecture 
Exhibition Bienale di Venezia in 2012 and obtained the top prize, which 
helped bring international notoriety to TOD.  U-TT proposed an innovative 
form of experimental intervention geared to take advantage of the collective 
efforts of TOD residents.15  The plan envisioned retrofitting TOD so it 
could generate its own power, the installation of an efficient water system, 
and other technologies that would improve the livelihood of TOD residents, 
and which U-TT hoped– could serve as a model of urban intervention to 
emulate.16  Unsurprisingly, U-TT’s proposed plan was met with great 
resistance in Venezuela, mostly because of the highly polarized political 
environment and the negative connotation attached to the occupation of 
TOD. 
The occupation of TOD was obviously illegal because none of the 
residents had been authorized by FOGADE (the owner) to move into the 
building, and much less to modify it for a purpose so different from its 
intended original use.  Notwithstanding, from a different standpoint, TOD 
became an example of a highly organized community with a functioning 
normative order that served its members better than the state or any other 
external system.  The purpose of this article is precisely to explore the 
factors that promote social order and foster law-abiding behavior in 
communities like TOD, which emerge outside –or even against– the state 
and its legal institutions.  Following this introduction, Section II of this 
article delves into a contextual explanation of the political and social 
environment in which the TOD community arose and thrived, its 
governance regime including the creation of internal norms, and the 
enforcement mechanisms used to materialize the obligations arising from 
those norms.  Section III, shifts the attention of the paper to a broader 
discussion regarding the main factors that contribute to achieving social 
order in settings that emerge in apparent contradiction of the official legal 
system, such as the TOD community.  This section also discusses the 
emergence of private norms in such context, their relationship with the 
official legal system, and the effectiveness of community-based 
 
14 Id. at 33-34. 
15 Id. at 334, et. seq. 
16 Id. 
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enforcement mechanisms.  The article concludes with a brief discussion of 
how the analysis presented here contributes to the literature on private 
ordering. 
THE FALL OF A DREAM, AND THE RISE OF A COMMUNITY 
1) IF ONLY DAVID KNEW:  FROM RICHES TO RAGS 
The moniker Tower of David was given to the skyscraper after 
banking mogul David Brillembourg, the CEO and owner of Grupo 
Confinanzas (“GC”), one of the most influential financial conglomerates in 
Venezuela during the decades of the eighties and early nineties.  TOD was 
the tallest in a six-building complex that would form the Confinanzas 
Financial Center.  When completed, TOD promised to be the eight tallest 
building in Latin America, and certainly one of the most modern.  The all-
glass covered building would have been crowned by a helipad, and the 
entire complex was supposed to offer ample commercial parking, a hotel, 
and retail space.  The formidable ascent of Brillembourg in the local 
financial and banking sector during those years, and his business acumen 
and audacity, earned him the nickname King David, so it was obvious for 
the crown jewel of his ambitious real estate project to bear his name. 
Most of Brillembourg’s fortune resulted from his involvement in 
construction and real estate transactions, mortgage and insurance, and later 
on, from his success in the Caracas stock market.  Brillembourg’s financial 
audacity was admired in the local banking circles.  He had successfully 
built and financed many commercial real estate projects in Venezuela, 
which gave him enough liquidity to purchase a bank, and other financial 
institutions.  One of his most memorable transactions, which occurred in 
1990 at the pinnacle of his financial career, was the hostile take-over of a 
local brewery through a savvy maneuver that reportedly earned him five 
hundred million dollars, a notable sum for the relatively small Caracas 
financial sector.  That same year, the Caracas stock exchange closed with an 
all-time record figure of five billion dollars in transactions, which was 
remarkable for a market that the previous year did not even cross the twelve 
million dollar mark. 
The construction of Centro Confinanzas began in 1990, but it was 
abruptly interrupted three years later, and never resumed.  One of the main 
reasons was Brillembourg’s sudden illness and his untimely death due to 
cancer, which drove his personally controlled financial conglomerate to a 
downward spiral.  Another contributing factor was political in nature.  
During those years, Venezuelan underwent a profound crisis as then-
president Carlos Andrés Perez endured widespread street protests in 1989, 
two frustrated coups d’état in 1992, and later succumbed to a scandalous 
allegation of mismanagement of a discretionary funds account, which 
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resulted in his impeachment, imprisonment, and fall into political disgrace.  
Although some analysts have attributed Perez’s demise to a political 
vendetta, the existence of a general crisis was undeniable.  After Perez’s 
fall, the country’s leadership went through a difficult transition until new 
general elections were held in 1994. 
After an apparent return to political normalcy that resulted from the 
arrival of Rafael Caldera to the presidency, Venezuela was hit by an 
unprecedented financial crisis that caused most local banks to implode and 
be placed under a special receivership regime by government authorities.  
Many bank directors, including their lawyers, were indicted as a result of a 
judicial witch-hunt that sought to find the culprit for the alleged 
manipulation of the markets, including the false reporting by the leading 
local banks of their real credit portfolio to the regulatory agencies, and 
many other counts of fraud.  The shakedown had implications on all sectors 
of the economy; it also eroded the stability of the government, and the 
public confidence on the country’s legal institutions.  Almost every 
financial institution operating in the country, including those that were part 
of GC were affected, and many of their directors were indicted, removed 
from their managerial duties, and their property seized. 
The special receiver appointed by the government to manage the 
troubled banks was given the task to oversee the day-to-day activities, and 
to determine whether the institution should be recovered or liquidated.  In 
the course of the receivership, the assets of many banks and related 
institutions were eventually transferred to the General Fund for the 
Guarantee of Deposits (“FOGADE”) to further compensate the myriad of 
accountholders and other customers who suffered lost as a result of the 
crisis.  Depending on each situation, some of the seized assets were 
disposed of through public actions—as a way to obtain liquidity and 
compensate the injured bank customers—while others remained in the 
hands of FOGADE or the government-controlled institutions.  Numerous 
office buildings, some of which were located in the most exclusive areas of 
Caracas, and also in foreign cities such as Miami and New York, also 
succumbed to this fate.  During the receivership, many construction projects 
were paralyzed and later abandoned due to lack of resources or 
management, and TOD was one of those. 
THE ABANDONED TOWER AND THE BOLIVARIAN MISIONES 
The barebones concrete structure of TOD partially covered in glass 
was boarded off and slowly fell into despair during the next several years 
after the government takeover.  GC was eventually liquidated, and its assets 
—including TOD—were dispersed among different government controlled 
entities.  In the case of TOD, it was transferred to FOGADE, which became 
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its legal owner.  Despite a change in its legal status, TOD continued in the 
same state of abandonment.  At least in one occasion, the government tried 
to sell the project for sixty million dollars, but no bidders showed interest.17  
In 2014, there were rumors that a Chinese banking consortium had 
purchased the entire complex, but the government denied it.18  During all 
these years, TOD became a reminder of the golden years of the baking 
industry in Venezuela, and also turned into an eyesore in the skyline of an 
otherwise modern and prosperous city. 
With the financial crisis apparently resolved, Venezuela entered into a 
new era.  A radical change in the government occurred in 1998 with the 
victory of Hugo Chavez, a former military commander who had 
participated in the 1992 attempt to depose the government.  Chavez vowed 
to lead a so-called political revolution that promoted a sweeping 
constitutional amendment, a transformation of the government to bring it 
closer to the people, and a radical departure from traditional Venezuelan 
politics.  His initial term was faced with important challenges, including 
some corruption scandals related to the management of social funds, a 
natural disaster in late 1999 that left tens of thousands of victims homeless 
and in need of immediate government assistance, and a nationwide strike in 
2003 that shut down the oil industry—Venezuela’s main economic 
engine—for almost two months and contributed to the accelerated crisis.  
On the other hand, oil prices soared and reached historical highs, which 
filled the government’s coffers almost overnight and gave the Chavista 
administration an enormous political and economic leverage both 
domestically and internationally. 
Starting in 2004, the Venezuelan government invested significant 
resources in an array of social programs that it called Misiones Bolivarianas 
(Bolivarian Missions).19 The stated objective of the Misiones was to 
provide immediate solutions to pressing issues such as health, housing, 
education, and food; but the government made no secret that it would also 
use the Misiones as political tools, and more concretely, to purchase votes.20  
Despite the generous allocation of funds to the Misiones, the government 
was unable to offer a systematic solution to the different problems that it 
sought to address through those social programs.21  One of the most critical 
problems was the lack of sufficient housing exacerbated by several factors.  
 
17 Brillembourg, Torre David at 89. 
18 Desalojan a ocupantes de ‘Torre David’, El Universal, (Caracas), July 22, 2014, available at 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/el-mundo/2014/desalojan-torre-david-caracas-1025049.html. 
19 See generally Manuel A. Gómez, Malleable Law: The (mis)Use of Legal Tools in the Pursuit 
of a Political Agenda,  19 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 509 (2013) [hereinafter Manuel A. Gómez, 
Malleable Law]. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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The main ones were the tens of thousands of Venezuelans who lost their 
homes to floods and other natural disasters, the ultra protectionist pro-tenant 
policies that deterred renters from leasing their property, the complete halt 
of the construction industry, and the growing demand caused by the 
migratory waves from rural areas to the major cities. 
SQUATTERS: READY, SET, GO. . . 
In order to appease an increasingly impatient populace, the 
government implemented certain protectionist policies such as a ban on 
residential evictions; it also froze rent prices, and ordered the suspension of 
all pending litigation involving tenants.22  Far from offering a permanent 
solution to the problem, these measures were just a temporary fix, and 
further contributed to the polarization between tenants and property owners 
thus incentivizing the latter to devise creative ways to bypass the regulatory 
limitations.23  As the situation worsened and the government became more 
radicalized against the private sector, several high-ranking government 
officials, including President Chavez himself, began encouraging people to 
occupy any unused private land or building without fearing eviction or any 
similar action.24  Squatting became rampant throughout the country,25 and 
those engaged in it routinely brandished Venezuelan flags to insinuate that 
they had government support.26 
Once squatters occupied a building the only option left to the owner 
was to negotiate directly with them or to rely on other extralegal means, 
given that no effective legal remedies were available.27  Although most of 
the affected property was privately owned, squatting also affected 
government-owned buildings and even public spaces.28  The lack of basic 
 
22 Suspendidos en el país 40 mil juicios inmobiliarios, CÁMARA INMOBILIARIA DE VENEZUELA, 
Jan. 26, 2011, available at http://www.camarainmobiliaria.org.ve/articles/1535; see also Decreto con 
Rango y Fuerza de Ley contra el Desalojo y la Desocupación Arbitraria de Viviendas, OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE, May 5, 2011, No. 39,668.  
23 See, e.g., Lorenzi and Martusciello v. AFIVEL, Juzgado Primero del Municipio Iribarren de la 
Circunscripción Judicial del Estado Lara, Feb. 1, 2006 (finding a commodatum—gratuitious loan—
contract to be a fraudulent tactic against the rights of the tenant). 
24 Teodoro Petkoff, El discurso invasor, TAL CUAL, Jan. 25, 2011; see also Valentina Lares 
Martiz, Se desata ola de invasiones por ley de tierras en Venezuela, EL TIEMPO, Feb. 5, 2005, available 
at http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1676976. 
25 Felipe Benitez, Por Un Pais de Propietarios: Estadísticas, casos de violaciones a la 
propiedad privada en Venezuela, Noviembre 2005-11, Nov. 2011, available at http://paisde 
propietarios.org/home/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/PDP_Estadisticas_Final1.pdf. 
26 Luis Alberto Perozo Padua, Invasores de La Puera exigen que terrenos baldíos sean para la 
Misión Vivienda, EL IMPULSO, Dec. 5, 2013, available at http://elimpulso.com/articulo/invasores-de-
la-puerta-exigen-que-terrenos-baldios-sean-para-la-mision-vivienda#. 
27 Gerardo Blyde, Invasiones Legalizadas, EL UNIVERSAL, Dec. 16, 2011, available at http://
www.eluniversal.com/opinion/111216/invasiones-legalizadas. 
28 See Brillembourg, Torre David, at 102; see also Rubén Bolívar Idrogo, GNB impidió invasion 
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services such as water, sewage, electricity, and a barebones structure that 
lacked windows, most walls and even stairs, made TOD an unlikely 
candidate for squatting at first glance. However, the building’s location in 
the heart of downtown Caracas, and thus easily accessible by public 
transportation, lessened such drawback and made it attractive to squatters.  
The defining event that drove people to seek shelter inside TOD was a 
devastating rainstorm that affected some of the city’s poorest 
neighborhoods and left numerous families homeless in September of 
2007.29  At first, the occupation, which was intended to be temporary, just 
affected the ground floor and it simply involved some tarps, tents, and other 
makeshift covers. 
Progressively, as more people arrived, and the ground floor became 
insufficient to accommodate all the residents, squatters moved into more 
permanent quarters in the higher floors, and the community leaders 
disallowed the use of tents.30  The residents started retrofitting and adapting 
parts of the building to their needs, including building walls, separating 
private from public areas, and organizing themselves as a self-sufficient 
community.  One of the defining moments in the occupation of TOD was 
the arrival of an Pentecostal evangelical leader named Alexander Daza (aka 
El Niño, “The Kid”) who established his church in the ground floor of the 
adjacent building (Torre B), and immediately became the de facto 
community leader.31  Daza was instrumental in organizing the occupants, 
who preferred to call themselves “neighbors,”32 instead of squatters, or 
trespassers, which is how the media has generally portrayed them.33  The 
fact that many of the residents were also members of the same church 
strengthened the sense of social cohesion, which in turn facilitated the 
creation of norms, and fostered intra-community cooperation.  Interestingly, 
some leaders of the increasingly popular Pentecostal evangelical church in 
Venezuela have been instrumental in the recent growth of shantytowns and 
the upsurge of squatting in that country.34 
 
a ocho edificios de Misión Vivienda, NOTITARDE, Dec. 9, 2013, available at http://www.notitarde.com/
Sucesos/GNB-impidio-invasion-a-ocho-edificios-de-Mision-Vivienda-/2013/12/10/288017 
29 There are some reports of a 2003 occupation, but if it occurred, it was only temporary and 
very negligible. See, John Lee Anderson, Slumlord, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 28, 2013 [hereinafter, 
Anderson, Slumlord]. 
30 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 138. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 70. 
33 See generally Anderson, Slumlord; Thomas Wagner, Socialism in Skyscraper, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE, May 30, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/chavez-anhaenger-besetzen-in-caracas-
wolkenkratzer-torre-de-david-fotostrecke-82563.html; Javier Brassesco, Torre de David se Blinda Ante 
la Incertidumbre, EL UNIVERSAL, Feb. 20, 2013, available at http://www.eluniversal.com/caracas/
130220/torre-de-david-se-blinda-ante-la-incertidumbre.  
34 See generally RAFAEL SÁNCHEZ, SEIZED BY THE SPIRIT: THE MYSTICAL FOUNDATION OF 
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THE ORDER WITHIN 
In 2009, Daza led the community to adopt a formal governance 
structure through the establishment of the CCV, of which he also became 
the president.  Members of Daza’s inner circle undertook different roles, 
and were also vested with formal titles such as Secretary and Deputy 
Manager of Social Services and Finances, Security Coordinator, Electricity 
and Water Crew, and Floor Coordinator.  In total, the cooperative employed 
approximately thirty-three people.35  The formation of a cooperative was 
also an important way for the community to benefit from government 
programs, including loans, microcredits, and other forms of assistance 
offered by the Chavez administration to cooperatives.36  Moreover, the 
CCV became the community’s official representative regarding the defense 
of the rights of TOD’s residents vis-à-vis the municipal and national 
governments, and other public and private entities.  One example of this 
intermediation was the negotiation between CCV and the utility companies 
regarding the provision of water and electricity to the building.37 
The promotion of cooperatives and similar organizations became an 
important component of the government’s social and economic agenda 
since the beginning of the Chavez administration.38 The government vowed 
to create opportunities for disenfranchised citizens who had been 
traditionally excluded from economic opportunities and from political 
participation.39 The support not only came in the form of political 
endorsement but also through the passage of special legislation regulating 
cooperative associations,40 and the establishment of an administrative 
agency in charge of overseeing their activities.41 
Given that many government benefits, especially those offered through 
the Misiones, were mostly accessible only to those who showed 
unconditional support for the Chavista regime, TOD residents were also 
pressured to join the ranks of the ruling political party (United Socialist 
 
SQUATTING AMONG PENTECOSTALS IN CARACAS (VENEZUELA) TODAY, 267-305 (Public Culture) (2008); 
see also, Brillembourg, Torre David, at 141. 
35 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 212. 
36 Gustavo Silva, Logros de la Revolución Bolivariana. Razones para votar por Chávez el 3 de 
Diciembre, Nov. 14, 2006, available at: http://www.aporrea.org/misiones/a27203.html; see also, Betsy 
Bowman & Bob Stone, Venezuela’s Cooperative Revolution, DOLLARS & SENSE (July/Aug. 2006), 
available at http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2006/0706bowmanstone.html. [Hereinafter 
Bowman & Stone, Cooperative Revolution] 
37 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 216, 223. 
38 See Bowman & Stone, Cooperative Revolution. 
39 Id. 
40 See generally Ley Especial de Asociaciones Cooperativas, OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 37,285, 
Sept. 18, 2001. 
41 See Superintendencia Nacional de Asociaciones Cooperativas (SUNACOOP), http://
www.mpcomunas.gob.ve/sunacoop/.  
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Party of Venezuela, or “PSUV”).42  The use of the Misiones as voting 
purchasing strategies became one of Chavez’s most effective measures to 
engage ordinary citizens in political activism in exchange for tangible 
benefits, mostly in the form of cash transfers.43  Because of the secrecy and 
informality that characterized the management of the Misiones and the 
discretion given to those in charge of the different programs, it is 
impossible to know with precision how much has been disbursed under 
each program, but the general perception is that in the heyday of the 
Misiones the total funds disbursed by the government through these social 
programs were about 4.5 percent of Venezuela’s GDP.44  Regardless of 
whether TOD residents directly benefitted from the Misiones or other 
government programs, and how much they obtained from these sources; it 
is evident that they did not rely exclusively on that kind of assistance to 
support themselves. 
As the TOD community became consolidated and grew in size, it also 
encouraged the entrepreneurial spirit of certain individuals who strived to 
meet the needs of their fast growing vertical neighborhood.45  As a result, 
the community saw the emergence of small businesses, such as a few small 
grocery stores, a cafeteria, a school supply store, a beauty salon, a call 
center, a day care facility, a tailoring shop, and a video game arcade.46  In 
addition, the residents built a church, a gym, a basketball court, and other 
recreational areas.  The basketball court became a particularly important 
space and the subject of strict regulation by the cooperative, which enacted 
a code of conduct (e.g., no cursing in the court, no playing without 
uniform), sponsored a league, and appointed a sports coordinator to enforce 
the rules and organize the activities.47 
The cooperative kept tight control regarding the operation of any 
businesses established at TOD.  Every stand or store that engaged in 
commercial activities had to be expressly authorized by the Board, which 
even regulated their prices and profit margins.48  For example, those 
merchants operating from the ground to the 10th floor “must sell their 
goods at prices regulated by the government. Above the 10th floor, on the 
other hand, shop owners, are permitted to set their prices at one or two 
 
42 See generally Manuel A. Gómez, Malleable Law. 
43 See, e.g., Decree No. 4.342, Mar. 5, 2006, Mision Madres del Barrio San Carlos Cojedes 
[Mission Mothers of the Shanty Town San Carlos Cojedes], art. 1. 
44 JAVIER CORRALES & MICHAEL PENFOLD-BECERRA, DRAGON IN THE TROPICS: HUGO CHÁVEZ 
AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REVOLUTION IN VENEZUELA 42 (Brookings Institution Press 2011) 
[hereinafter Dragon in the Tropics]. 
45 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 210. 
46 Id. at 138, 210. 
47 Id. at 141. 
48 Interview with Pedro G. (TOD resident), Aug. 8, 2014, Caracas, Venezuela. 
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bolívares more than the government mandate, taking into account the costs 
and difficulty of transportation.”49  Furthermore, some businesses such as 
the hairdresser on the 20th floor, operated out of “rented” space, which was 
also subject to approval and oversight by CCV.  The cooperative also 
helped organize a transportation system to shuttle residents from the ground 
to the 10th floor through the ramps.50 The system consisted of a fleet of 
dedicated mototaxis that served the community around the clock.51 
Other services organized by the community were the provision of 
sewage and garbage disposal,52 clean water distribution,53 and electricity.54  
Some of these services, such as waste management, required coordination 
with the municipality. The provision of utilities such as electricity and clean 
water were facilitated by the CCV through an intricate web of jury-rigged 
pipes, cables, and other connections; and were also possible through an 
agreement between the CCV and the local government.55  In this sense, the 
CCV became an effective mediator between the neighbors and the outside 
world. 
Internally, the CCV was at the top of a well-defined governance 
pyramid that comprised a President, a Secretary and Deputy Manager, a 
Board of Directors (“Junta Directiva”), Floor Coordinators, and also Water 
Distribution, Electricity, and Facility Cleaning Coordinators.56  The 
ultimate decision-making authority of CCV rested on the President, who 
had “the absolute and final say on everything.”57  The authority of the CCV 
President and his perceived legitimacy was enhanced by the fact that, as 
pastor of the community church, Mr. Daza was also the spiritual and moral 
leader of the community.  His dual role as top administrator and spiritual 
advisor gave him clout and also strengthened his legitimacy both internally 
among his fellow residents, and externally in the eyes of government 
officials and any other actors that entered into a relationship with TOD.  
CCV’s board members were chosen from among Daza’s inner circle, which 
strengthened their own social network. 
The most influential board member appeared to be Gladys Flores,58 a 
 
49 Id. at 210. 
50 De rascacielos a rancho vertical, TAL CUAL DIGITAL, Aug. 20, 2012, available at http://
www.talcualdigital.com/Nota/visor.aspx?id=75548&tipo=AVA. 
51 Andrew Rosati, Caracas is Finally Ending the ‘World’s Tallest Squat’, PRI (Sept. 12, 2014), 
available at http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-12/caracas-finally-ending-worlds-tallest-squat. 
52 Brillembourg, Torre David, at 214. 
53 Id. at 216. 
54 Id. at 222. 
55 Id. at 216. 
56 Id. at 148. 
57 Id. 
58 Javier Brassesco, Una Mirada desde la Torre de David, EL UNIVERSAL (Sept. 14, 2012), 
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charismatic woman appointed Secretary and Deputy Manager of Social 
Services and Finances. Flores was also put in charge of overseeing “the 
third circle of leadership, the floor coordinators, who are charged with 
organizing space and ensuring that the building systems on his or her 
respective floors are maintained.”59  The remaining board members were 
given the task of coordinating core activities such as water services, 
electricity, cleaning, and the oversight of the security personnel deployed at 
the main gate and other access points to TOD.  Although the most critical 
decisions were made at the highest level, CCV representatives held 
numerous general meetings to which all residents were invited.60  The board 
used these meetings to gauge the interest of the community on certain 
issues, and to assess the legitimacy of the decisions made by the President 
and his inner circle.  What resulted from this was a hybrid governance 
system of bottom-up democratic discussion and authoritarian decision-
making by Daza and his aides.61 
The CCV Secretary and the Board of Directors handled most 
collective and individual grievances.62  Depending on the type of issue at 
stake, the norm allegedly breached, the parties, and the potential impact on 
the community, the Secretary could act as a mediator by attempting to bring 
the parties to an agreement, or simply exercise her authority and adjudicate 
the dispute in a binding manner.63  Floor coordinators also played a limited 
role by repressing violations that occurred within their floor, and sports 
coordinators did the same regarding disputes that arose in their territory.  
Some examples of violations included the sale, lease, or transfer of rights 
over “private” spaces without authorization; the use of public areas in a 
manner contrary to the interest of the community, littering, and trespassing.  
Most rules and regulations were posted on a board affixed to the wall in 
each floor, which also mentioned the threat of sanctions that varied between 
a fine, and eviction from the floor or the community. 
The existence of a detailed system of community rules and the 
corresponding enforcement mechanisms reveals that the TOD is neither a 
“cultural island”64 with norms and traditions radically different from the 
ones that exist in the outside world, nor a disorganized society that rejects 
traditional values.  To the contrary, the social structure and the normative 
system developed at TOD are aligned and consistent with the values of the 
 
available at http://www.eluniversal.com/caracas/120914/una-mirada-desde-la-torre-de-david. 
59 Id. 
60 Interview with Irma R. (TOD resident), Aug. 8, 2014, Caracas, Venezuela. 
61 Brillembourg, Tower of David, at 148. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
64 Gerald Suttles, Social Order of the Slum, at 3.  
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larger society, and its official legal system.  One clear example of this 
alignment can be found in the adoption by TOD residents of a legally-
formed cooperative as the backbone of their administrative apparatus, and a 
leadership vested with formal roles.  In this sense, one can affirm that the 
governance regime in place at TOD mimics the larger society, and even 
relies on it to exist despite the negative perception of TOD as an 
environment where societal values are subverted and illegality is the norm.  
In the following section we will delve more into this concept. 
THE SKY(SCRAPER) IS NOT THE LIMIT: SOCIAL ORDER  
BEYOND THE OFFICIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE REDUX 
One of the most critical puzzles that has caught the attention of the 
private ordering literature is the interplay between intra-group cooperation 
and law-abiding behavior.  That is, whether and to what extent cooperation 
determines compliance with legal rules.  A related query deals with the 
relationship between legitimacy and authority; more specifically on whether 
cooperation or willingness to follow rules in enhanced by the presence of an 
authority, and whether the perceived legitimacy of such authority affects 
behavior in any way.  In the case of close-knit communities that operate 
outside the state apparatus and the official legal system, the interaction is 
conditioned by the existence of an internal social hierarchy, which in turn 
facilitated compliance with the indigenous order.65  Moreover, high-ranked 
or well-regarded members of the community are vested with adjudicative or 
decision-making roles that facilitate the enforcement of this private 
normative system.66  In the specific case of the TOD community, for 
example, such is the role performed by pastor Daza, and CCV’s Board 
members. 
The landscape of private ordering settings is ample,67 and the 
situations reported by the socio-legal literature tend to underscore the 
perceived efficiency of these environments vis-à-vis the shortcomings of 
the official legal system.68  The significance of those indigenous orderings69 
 
65 See Marc Galanter, Indigenous Law and Official Law in the Contemporary United States 1, 
Symposium in Bellagio, Italy: State Institutions and Their Use of Folk Law: Theoretical and Practical 
Issues (Sept. 21-25, 1981) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Following Galanter, “by 
indigenous law [we] refer not to some diffuse folk consciousness, but to concrete patterns of social 
ordering to be found in a variety of institutional settings” at 2. 
66 See Tehila Sagy, What’s so Private About Private Ordering?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 923, 926 
(2011). 
67 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 131 
(Harvard U. Press 1994) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW].  
68 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the 
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 83 (1989) [hereinafter Ellickson, Whaling]; Lisa Bernstein, 
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is believed to rest, among other things, on the long-standing multiplex 
relationships that bind the members of a given community or social group, 
and whose behavior is generally influenced by their adherence to a shared 
set of –internal– norms.  Voluntary compliance with indigenous norms 
tends to be high basically because group members view them as legitimate, 
and this legitimacy extends to those in position of authority within the 
community.  Furthermore, in those—rare—cases when community 
members do not follow these norms voluntarily, there tends to be an 
internal enforcement mechanism whereby effective sanctions are applied 
against the deviants, and the status quo ex ante is restored.70 
Most of the examples of private ordering found in the law and society 
literature feature thick descriptions of close-knit communities whose 
members are related to each other via intricate social ties based on ethnic, 
political, economic, and even religious reasons.  Such are the cases of the 
Hasidic diamond dealers of 47th street in New York City,71 the Palanpuri 
Jains based in Mumbai and Antwerp who now dominate the same industry 
at a global scale,72 the cotton merchants of Tennessee,73 the cattle ranchers 
of Northern California,74 or the Sumo wrestlers of Japan.75  To varying 
degrees these groups rely on their own extralegal contractual regimes.  The 
dispute processing mechanisms utilized by these communities are also 
diverse, and range from private arbitration to consensus building and 
conciliation.  However, one frequent attribute among these systems is the 
use of reputation-based sanctions as a catalyst for compliance. There, the 
observance of norms and internal rulings is not necessarily determined by 
 
Opting out of the Legal System: Extra-Legal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamonds]. 
69 See Galanter, Indigenous Law, supra note 65, at 2-3. 
70 A distinct, albeit related, issue here is peoples’ cooperation with the authorities in charge of 
enforcing the norms or laws.  See Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Cooperation Why do People Help the 
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 249 (2008), at 249 (“Compliance 
and cooperation appear to be largely distinct from one another, suggesting that the reasons why people 
obey the law may differ from why they may actively engage with police in the social regulation of 
crime.”). 
71 See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 61, at 115; Barak D. Richman, How Community 
Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 383 (2006). 
72 See Barak D. Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and Globalisation: Peering 
into the Diamond Industry, in LEGAL CERTAINTY BEYOND THE STATE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND 
THEORIES OF CHANGE (Volkmar Gessner ed., 2013); Manuel A. Gómez, Precious Resolution: The use 
of intra-Community Arbitration by Jain Diamond Merchants, 2 BELGIAN REVIEW OF ARBITRATION, B-
ARBITRA 119 (2013) [hereinafter, Gómez, Precious Resolution]. 
73 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). 
74 See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 60.  
75 See Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan’s Secret World of Sumo, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997). 
230 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:215 
 
the fear of a physical or economic sanction, but rather on the possibility of 
losing one’s good name in the eyes of the community, or being snubbed 
from one’s social circles.  The effectiveness of these types of sanctions is 
such that in some cases “being shunned or blackballed by the community is 
tantamount to a death sentence.”76 
Other examples of self-contained indigenous orders that deserve a 
special comment here are Utopian communities.  Historians have 
documented around three thousand cases of communes and other utopian 
experiments,77 many of which have taken place in the United States.78 
Utopias vary along a broad spectrum with regard to ideology, membership, 
governance, internal stratification, and economic model.  Their overall goal, 
however, is to basically propose an ideal social order radically different—
and hopefully better—from the society where their promoters came from.  
Utopian societies are generally associated with the idea of a new beginning, 
a fresh start, or the return to Gemeinschaft.79  In this respect, utopian 
societies tend to be idealistic, or as Sargent has said, “social dreams.”80  In 
order to achieve their purpose, most utopian experiments vow to reject 
mainstream society.  They tend to view any external force as competition or 
as an impediment to the attainment of their idealistic utopian goal.  As a 
result, utopian societies refuse most of the external norms prevalent in 
mainstream society, while at the same time promote their own legal order, 
which is also why some utopian communities may be perceived as 
countercultural.81 
It is precisely because of its apparent rejection of mainstream society 
and the idealistic ethos of the community that some people have suggested 
that temporary communities such as the one that hosts the Burning Man 
event be considered a type of utopia.82  But, when looking more carefully 
into Burning Man, one quickly realizes that the community’s departure 
 
76 See Gómez, supra note 72, at 130. 
77 Richard Sosis, Religion and Intragroup Cooperation: Preliminary Results of a Comparative 
Analysis of Utopian Communities, 34 CROSS-CULTURAL RES. 70, 73 (2000). 
78 For a comprehensive list of communal utopias in the United States, see DONALD E. PITZER, 
AMERICA’S COMMUNAL UTOPIAS 449 (Donald E. Pitzer, ed., 1997).  See also William L. Smith, 
Intentional Communities 1990-2000: A Portrait, 16 MICH. SOC. REV. 107, 112 (2002). 
79 See FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 66 (Jose Harris ed., 2001). 
80 See Lyman Tower Sargent, The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited, 5 UTOPIAN STUD. 1, 3 
(1994). 
81 But see Bennett M. Berger, Utopia and its Environment, 25 SOCIETY 37, 38 (1988) 
(suggesting a distinction between counterculture and utopia). 
82 See, e.g., Rachel Bowditch, The Somatic City: Rehearsing Utopia at the Burning Man 
Festival, UC DAVIS UNIV. LIBRARY, http://people.lib.ucdavis.edu/~davidm/xcpUrbanFeel/bowditch. 
html (last visited Aug. 10, 2015).  For an in-depth analysis of law abiding behavior at Burning Man, see 
Manuel A. Gómez, Order in the Desert: Law Abiding Behavior at Burning Man, 2013 MO. J. DISP. 
RESOL. 349 (2013). 
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from the ordinary and its seemingly utopian reaction against the order of 
high culture is only superficial, and in any case temporary.83  The 
carnivalesque trait of Burning Man creates a liminal space for transgression, 
license, and excess.84  Such atmosphere, however, is not promoted to 
undermine the external legal order, but rather to re-legitimize positive social 
values.  This is achieved by energizing the community to participate in a 
shared venture (the building of a temporary city), and to experiment with 
different forms of innovation in a controlled environment.85 
Members of the Burning Man community affirm their allegiance—at 
least for the duration of the event—to a list of Ten Principles.86 Most of 
these principles87 are neither indigenous to Burning Man nor opposed to 
mainstream society, but rather aligned with the external social values of 
what burners call the “real” world.  That is, the values of industrialized, 
western, and liberal societies.  Furthermore, in the particular case of the 
“leave no trace” principle, it was even expressed in an official US 
government policy before the Burning Man community embraced it.88 
Another key characteristic of utopian societies that is lacking in the 
Burning Man community is the physical commitment of their members and 
even their seclusion from the outside world. Although some members of the 
Burning Man community may remain in contact year-round, their physical 
commitment to the community only lasts one week.89  It could still be 
argued, however, that the utopian element of the Burning Man community 
does not necessarily rest on its rejection of external social order or its 
transient membership, but rather on its proposal of an idealized model of 
society devoid of conflict and inequality, and which focuses on promoting 
individual and communal artistic self-expression and inclusion.  Unlike 
Burning Man, utopias routinely demand their members not only to 
 
83 See Gómez, supra note 82. 
84 See Chris C. Rojek, Disney Culture, 12 LEISURE STUDIES 121, 121-35 (1993). 
85 See Gómez, supra note 82. 
86 Id. 
87 Perhaps with the exception of decommodification, self-reliance, and self-expression. Id.  
88 That is the case of the “leave no trace” principle, which was promoted as part of an effort 
during the 1970s to educate the general public to assist in minimizing the environmental degradation 
that resulted from a surge on outdoors activities in the United States.  See Jeffrey L. Marion & Scott E. 
Reid, Development of the U.S. Leave No Trace Program: An Historical Perspective (Jan. 2001) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
89 The issue of permanency has been long debated among members of the Burning Man 
community.  Some view Burning Man as a long-standing social movement that goes well beyond the 
annual summer gathering. See Press/Media, BURNING MAN, http://www.burningman.com/press/
myths.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). Moreover, the organization’s efforts to boost its regional network, 
the multiplication of Burning Man regional events, the myriad of community-oriented outreach 
programs, and even the rise of a virtual Burning Man community in online platforms such as Second 
Life, are signs of that.  See BURN2, http://www.burn2.org/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2015). 
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“commit”90 with their physical presence, to observe a strict code of conduct, 
and embrace a distinctive set of values, but also to expressly reject or 
disavow any external order.  Through this idea of commitment, utopian 
societies ensure their continuity, the cohesion of their members, and also 
guarantee that they behave in accordance with an internal normative order.  
Commitment demands that members show their unconditional loyalty to the 
community, endure certain sacrifices, and renounce to any outside 
influences.91 
Members of most utopian communities are also expected to relinquish 
or at least share their possessions, and sometimes even their own bodies for 
the benefit of the common welfare.  Although some utopian experiments 
have espoused an anarchic approach to social organization by rejecting not 
only external rules, but basically all rules,92 other models feature a clear 
normative structure and a complex stratification93 The communities 
included in this latter group also tend to require their members to endure 
various forms of mortification as punishment for their deviant behavior, and 
surrender themselves to the jurisdiction of the internal authorities.  This 
presupposes the existence of social and political hierarchies whereby one or 
several leaders, high priests, or elders take on the role of authorities while 
the rest remain as their subordinates. 
The best way to illustrate this is with religious utopias, where the 
community is organized around a set of spiritual dogmas that contain values 
and norms revealed to a few chosen individuals who are in charge of 
keeping order and promoting member cooperation.  As Sosis found out 
after conducting an empirical study of nineteenth century utopian 
communes, Sosis concluded the fact that religious beliefs “often entail a 
host of rituals and obligations and expected behavioral patterns”94 heightens 
the level of commitment and loyalty among members, thus promoting intra-
community cooperation and therefore ensuring the survival of the 
community95  This is believed to be the main reason why “religious 
communities are more likely than secular communes to survive at every 
stage of their life course.”96  It could be added that law-abiding behavior 
 
90 See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment and Social Organization: A Study of Commitment 
Mechanisms in Utopian Communities, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 499-517 (1968).  
91 For a thorough discussion of commitment in the context of utopian communities, see id. 
92 This is the case, for example, of the anarchistic or retreat communes described by Moss. See 
Rosabeth MOSS KANTER, COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY: COMMUNES AND UTOPIAS IN 
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1972). 
93 See Miguel Angel Ramiro Avilés, The Law-Based Utopia, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF UTOPIA 
225, 234 (Barbara Goodwin ed., 2001). 
94 See Sosis, supra note 77, at 70, 72. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 70.  
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within these religious communities stems from the belief among community 
members that the internal norms and the authorities called upon to 
communicate and enforce those norms are legitimate. That legitimacy may 
result from tradition passed onto younger community members by previous 
generations, or from emotional or affectual attitudes toward the spiritual 
dogmas upheld by the community.97 
Although the ultimate objective of utopian communities might be 
unattainable in practical terms, their members are not immune from having 
to cope with everyday issues, including disputes with other members over 
the interpretation and enforcement of legal rights.  The former demands the 
establishment of a governance system equipped, among other things, with 
mechanisms of internal social control. These mechanisms may take diverse 
forms, such as the court-like Judicial Committee entrusted with dispute 
resolution functions in the context of moshavim communities, to the 
informal control system personified by the general assembly of the 
kibbutzim.98 While most internal disputes are contained within the 
boundaries of the community’s own institutions, there have been cases 
where disgruntled members have sought the assistance of outside laws and 
official courts to help them interpret or enforce intra-community 
agreements,99 redefine their relationships, and even to recapture their 
utopian values100  The use of official courts—although exceptionally—by 
members of a community whose main goal is precisely to distance 
themselves from the Gesellschaft or larger society, may seem ironic.  It is, 
however, an indication that indigenous orders not only coexist with the 
official legal system, but the operation of both is intertwined and 
interdependent.101 
Moreover, there are instances where the use of officially sponsored 
courts for processing intra-community disputes is not the exception but the 
rule.  One example is the law-bound Tuna Court described by Feldman in 
 
97 See Martin E. Spencer, Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority, 21 BRIT. J. SOC., 123, 124 
(1970).  
98 See Allan E. Shapiro, Law in the Kibbutz: A Reappraisal, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 415 (1976); 
Richard D. Schwartz, Social Factors in the Development of Legal Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli 
Settlements, 63 YALE L. J. 471 (1954); Richard D. Schwartz, Law in the Kibbutz: A Response to 
Professor Shapiro, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 439 (1976).  For a general description of the general structure 
and features of the Kibbutzim, see MELFORD E. SPIRO, KIBBUTZ, VENTURE IN UTOPIA (1956); Melford 
E. Spiro, Utopia and Its Discontents: The Kibbutz and Its Historical Vicissitudes, 106 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 556 (2004).  
99 See, for example, the litigation involving the Shakers, the Harmonists, the Zoarites, and 
members of the Oneida community in US courts during the nineteenth century. Carol Weisbrod, Utopia 
and the Legal System, 25 SOCIETY 62, 63 (1988). 
100 See D.H. Meyer, Review, 16 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 101 (1981) (reviewing CAROL 
WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980)). 
101 See Galanter, Indigenous Law, supra note 65, at 5. 
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his study of Tokyo’s tuna merchants.102  There, members of a close-knit 
community of buyers and sellers of tuna transacting in the world’s premier 
fish market process their grievances through a state-sponsored specialized 
adjudicatory body, and not through unofficial mechanisms.  The Tuna 
Court did not stem from local custom or informal practices but from an 
ordinance issued by Tokyo’s Metropolitan Government, thus showing that 
under certain circumstances “formal law can outperform informal norms by 
satisfying the business needs of close-knight merchants while 
simultaneously contributing to the shared values that ensure the success of 
their future transactions.”103 
NORMS WITHOUT GOVERNMENT ON THE WAY TO “SEE THE ELEPHANT”104 
In each of the examples that we just described, the idea of social order 
rests on a prearranged system of norms that binds all members of a 
community.  There, law-abiding behavior is boosted by a sense of 
normative legitimacy, and further ensured by internal enforcement 
mechanisms comprised of effective reputation-based sanctions.  While in 
most cases the relevant norms are produced and applied independently from 
the state, there are also examples where private actors choose to rely instead 
on official rules and public institutions.  Notwithstanding their usefulness 
for describing the rationale behind private ordering in the context of close-
knit communities, none of the aforementioned situations shed light on what 
happens when community and state-sponsored institutions are absent or 
inoperative.  In other words, one is still left wondering what could promote 
law-abiding behavior and cooperation in an environment like that of TOD, 
one devoid of any direct form of external social control or government 
authority. 
This is precisely the question that John Phillip Reid and others tried to 
answer with their studies on property rights, crime, law enforcement, and 
social behavior on America’s overland trail between 1849 and 1890.105  
During that period, the western territories of the United States not only 
 
102 See Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish Market, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (2006). 
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104 As Burns points out, “the phrase ‘seeing the Elephant’ was frequently used during the 
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105 See JOHN PHILLIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT (1980); JOHN PHILLIP REID, POLICING THE 
ELEPHANT: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1997); TERRY L. 
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lacked a central government but any form of government.106 Many among 
the thousands of emigrant explorers who embarked on the conquest of the 
west had barely anything in common, except for the fact that they were all 
headed to see the Elephant, to find fortune, and to start a new life.  People 
from all walks of life and from different parts of the world left everything 
behind and rushed to the newly discovered California gold fields, or to the 
farmlands of the Oregon territory.  Popular assumptions were rife that 
violence, anarchy, and disregard for property107 reigned during those times 
“with no one group having a monopoly on mayhem”108 It turns out, 
however, that the seemingly Hobbesian109 environment of bellum omnium 
contra omnes110 in the American West was not really lawless, “but one 
where people were aware of some notion of social and legal order and 
respected it.”111 
After examining a considerable amount of historical records from the 
California Gold Rush period, Reid and others concluded that the forty-
niners112 and their successors understood and respected property rights.  The 
explorers also established an effective system of governance where court-
like institutions were vested with authority to adjudicate local disputes, 
applying their own substantive norms and procedural rules.113  The 
anticipated hardships and uncertainty that laid ahead for the emigrants 
incentivized them to develop rules of collective action and to forge 
partnerships of economic, social and political nature.  Their governance 
devices spanned from constitutions adopted by relatively small groups of 
individuals sharing a wagon train114 to enforcement mechanisms resulting 
from the cooperative efforts of their members.  These emerging 
communities also develop myriads of miners’ codes115 that regulated the 
fast-growing mining activity and the courts established throughout the West 
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to decide mining-related claims116  It is true that some groups of pioneers 
had a common ethnical origin, religious belief, socio-economic status, and 
customs.  Not surprisingly, the members of these groups remained bound to 
the same social values and cultural identities of their places of origin.117  
But those values and cultural identities were far from being homogenous 
across the entire population of explorers. 
The hundreds of thousands of individuals who rushed to the West 
during those four decades encompassed very diverse groups, many of which 
had little or nothing in common, but nonetheless managed to organize 
themselves in communities that promoted cooperation and maintained a 
desirable level of social order.  Some of those communities, such as the 
ones formed by wagon train mates during the two thousand mile journey 
across the Great Plains, were temporary.  Others, on the other hand, 
acquired permanency and eventually contributed to the development of 
towns and cities, which in turn were folded into the political divisions of the 
newly-formed states.  What is truly remarkable is not how or why the 
clusters of émigrés sharing the same value system held it together amongst 
themselves after having left their hometowns, but rather how such a 
disparate array of different social groups was able to coexist throughout the 
Overland Trail and maintain a reasonable level of social order. 
One could argue that the Overland Trail communities thrived and 
attained order not only because of the cultural predisposition of their 
individual members toward law, their legal habits, or the customs, 
traditions, and values that they brought from home.118  More importantly, 
they were motivated to cooperate with their fellow adventurers, which in 
turn may have helped them achieve an acceptable level of social order.  On 
one hand, the émigrés were incentivized by the possibility of obtaining 
material gains for their efforts, and thus fought to reduce any potential 
sources of social friction that could obstruct their path to prosperity.119  As a 
result, they defined individual and communal rights, established 
mechanisms to foster cooperation that contributed to reduce transaction 
costs and maximized their gains, and also pushed for the creation of 
institutions to enforce those rights.120  On the other hand, as the 
communities across the newly populated territories attained stability and 
their members strengthened their social ties, their incentives to cooperate 
expanded beyond the idea of minimizing transaction costs and maximizing 
personal gain. 
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FROM THE OVERLAND TRAIL ALL THE WAY TO THE VERTICAL COMMUNITY 
There are obviously many historical and contextual differences 
between the mining camps of the 1800s in the western United States and the 
community that recently formed at TOD.  Notwithstanding, both examples 
also have important traits in common. First, both the forty-niners and the 
TOD squatters rushed to a new life in a physical space full of challenges 
and hardships.  Second, the anticipation of these difficulties acted as an 
incentive for group members to develop their own rules of collective action, 
and to forge efficient collaborations of economic, social and political 
nature.  Third, the presence of a pre-existent set of values, religious or 
otherwise, among certain members of the community, facilitated social 
cohesion, cooperation, and the promotion of law-abiding behavior.  This 
can be found—in the case of TOD—in the fact that most community 
members belong to and are active members of the same evangelical church, 
which also appears to have an important influence on the community at 
large.  Finally, the indigenous system that emerged as a result of these 
interactions was aligned with the values of the larger society, despite the 
perception that these communities symbolize a rejection of the official 
order. 
CONCLUSION 
The TOD community is far from perfect, and is certainly not an ideal 
social setting.  As described earlier, the initial occupation was motivated by 
extreme necessity and not by free choice.  TOD residents are conscious of 
their illegal status, and also acknowledge that their presence in the building 
might have occurred in contravention of the official legal system.  To them, 
however, occupying the building was the lesser of two evils, and a 
desperate measure in light of their dire living conditions.  Given the relative 
seclusion of the TOD community from the outside world and its 
inaccessibility from the jurisdictional reach of official authorities, outsiders 
assumed that TOD was just occupied by criminals who lived in a state of 
violent chaos.  The opposite was true. TOD inhabitants were mostly 
desperate, struggling people who seized the opportunity of living in the 
heart of the capital city instead of the inaccessible and dangerous suburban 
shantytowns. Others arrived to TOD after losing their homes and being left 
with no other viable housing options. Some had small children or elderly 
relatives, so living near their workplace was obviously desirable. 
Upon moving into TOD, the residents faced incredible hardship and 
formed a community that has worked reasonably well. Far from the image 
offered by the media and the popular culture depicting TOD as a dangerous 
slum, the community has attained a level of social order aligned with the 
values of the wider society.  It is precisely because of the distinctive 
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features of TOD that some have even denied its characterization as a slum. 
TOD residents are sheltered against the elements and have sufficient space 
to live in, access to safe water, and functioning toilets.  They are not, 
however, guaranteed against forced evictions, which is the only 
characteristic that TOD shares with slums. Slum or not, the TOD 
community has shown that it is not a chaotic place that promotes the anti-
law.  To the contrary, not only has the TOD community developed its own 
normative system, but also its residents have even embraced the official 
legal system by adopting the legal personality of a cooperative association, 
which has in turn allowed its members to interact with the government and 
other private actors. 
The squatting of abandoned buildings should not be encouraged or 
romanticized for it entails many dangers, including the personal safety and 
health of the occupants.  Governments should make an effort to assist their 
disenfranchised citizens in obtaining adequate housing and to realize their 
aspirations of living in decent conditions without having to face undue 
hardships; but examples such as the TOD community show that in absence 
of adequate policies and government support, citizens are still able to 
organize privately and efficiently to improve the communal life. 
 
